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Architexturet
Addison C. Harris Lecture
March 20, 2002
AKHIL REED AMAR'
Architectural images shape America's basic constitutional vocabulary. Lawyers
and layfolk alike refer to those who ordained and established the Constitution as
"Founders" and"Framers"-builders who laid the foundations and framed the timbers
of the grand constitutional edifice we inhabit. And we call the most important
remodeling of this edifice "the Reconstruction."'
Architectural metaphor is no newcomer to constitutional conversation. At the outset
of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the two leading draftsmen-dare I say
architects?---of what would become the Constitution voiced their visions in
remarkably similar terms. First came James Wilson, "contend[ing] strenuously for
drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people.
He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason
wished to give it as broad a basis as possible." Then came James Madison: "He
thought too that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable if it
should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand
merely on the pillars of the Legislature[]."3 Writing later as Publius, Alexander
Hamilton summoned up a similar image in explaining the need for popular ratification
of the proposed Constitution: "[T]he foundations of our national government [must
lie] deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American
t Copyright 2002 by Akhil Reed Amar. Permission is hereby granted to reproduce and
distribute this Article in whole or in part for personal, professional or educational purposes,
provided such copies are disseminated at or below cost, provided that each copy bears this
notice, and provided that the Indiana Law Journal is credited as the original published source.
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This Article derives from the Addison
C. Harris Lecture delivered at the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington on March
20, 2002. I am indebted to the staff of the National Constitution Center for encouraging me to
think about the connections between architecture and the Constitution. I also owe special
thanks to Richard Albert, Jon Blue, Ileana Ciobanu, Neal Katyal, Vasan Kesavan, Jonathan
Kravis, Jed Rubenfeld, and Jake Sullivan for their helpful suggestions.
I. For prominent architectural allusion in a distinguished contribution to the Harris
Lecture Series itself, see Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and
Administrative Courts Under Article I1, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990).
2. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 49 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966) [hereinafter THE RECORDS] (May 3 1). Modem readers may see the architectural
image more vividly if they substitute the more modem word "base" for Wilson's more archaic
"basis." See I THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 985 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds.,
2d ed. 1989)
3. THE RECORDS, supra note 2, at 50 (May 31). The word "fabric" here and in later
quotations refers to a building, not a textile. To the Founding generation "rearing a fabric"
meant erecting a building, not growing cotton. See 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 638
(J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989).
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empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people."4 And here are the
words of John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison: "That the people have an original
right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall
most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American
fabric has been erected. 5
Now, I am not an architect, nor do I play one on TV. But I suggest that if we
examine the Constitution's text as an architect might, we will notice key features of
the document-its size and shape, its style and layout, its exterior facades and interior
motifs-whose significance is lost on most lawyers and judges today. Consider what
follows an experiment in architexture.
I. SIZE AND FUNCTION
When human beings initially approach a building or other architectural work, we
instinctively size it up, feeling its magnitude or modesty. Thus, the first architextural
thing to observe about the United States Constitution is its remarkable compactness.
From Preamble to the Twenty-seventh Amendment, it does its work in less than 8000
words. When President Washington took office in 1789, the document was even
smaller, comprising a mere 4500 words. The entire Bill of Rights uses fewer than 500
words, and the three transformative Reconstruction Amendments use only slightly
more than that.
By way of comparison, the average state constitution today sprawls out over some
30,000 words.6 Indeed, the federal Constitution is smaller than every single one of the
fifty state constitutions now in force.7 The Vermont, New Hampshire, and Indiana
Constitutions are at least in the neighborhood, at around 10,000 words apiece.' By
contrast, Alabama's Constitution occupies a neighborhood (a city?) by itself at over
300,000 words-roughly forty times the size of the federal document.'
What are we to make of the federal Constitution's modest architextural dimensions?
For the Constitution is far from a modest document in its ambition: to lay the
framework for a mighty nation to rival and ultimately surpass the Old Powers of
Europe and the great empires of antiquity."James Wilson's allusion to the towering
pyramids of Egypt is revealing; the framers dreamt big. They envisioned a
geographically vast republic, peopled with countless millions, extending far into the
future, and revolutionizing the world. And they literally built big in the national
capital.
In 1787, the distance between the northern district of Massachusetts (now known
as Maine) and the southern edge of Georgia was daunting by world historical
standards. Never before in human history had so vast a region, encompassing so many
4. Tim FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (emphasis altered) (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed. 1961). Hereinafter all citations are to this edition.
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
6. See the state data summarized in Christopher W. Hammons, State Constitutional
Reform: Is it Necessary?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1327, 1350 tbl.l (2001). The arithmetic mean is
around 34,000 words; the median around 24,000. See id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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different climates (to say nothing ofsects) been governed democratically. Historically,
extended empires meant emperors; continental kingdoms required kings. But the
Framers reveled in their grand plan to prove that self-governing societies could stretch
far beyond small city-states like Athens, Sparta, and pre-imperial Rome. In The
Federalist No. 9, Publius reminded his readers that individual states like Virginia
(which then encompassed what we now all West Virginia as well as Kentucky) were
already seeking to expand self-governmentbeyond the compact republics of antiquity,
where all citizens could meet face to face in the city square.'0 The concept of
representation, according to The Federalist Nos. 10 and 63, enabled far-ranging
democracies to hold together."
And America would prove all this to the world.
For evidence of this immodest vision, we need look no further than the first
paragraph of the first Federalist. America's new Constitution, Publius trumpeted,
would determine "the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the
world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the
people of this country, by, their conduct and example" to prove to all "mankind" the
workability of popular self-government." Consider also the stunningly immodest
language of The Federalist No. 14 (complete with architectural allusion at the end):
Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America
... can no longer be fellow-citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing
empire. Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of
government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political
world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors;
that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish .... [W]hy is the
experiment of an extended republic to be rejected merely because it may
comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America that, whilst
they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other
nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or
for names, to overrule the suggestions oftheir own good sense, the knowledge
of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly
spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the
example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theater in
favor of private rights and public happiness.... Happily for America, happily
we trust for the whole human race, [the American Revolutionaries] pursued
a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no
parallel in the annals ofhuman society. They reared the fabrics ofgovernments
which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a
great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and
perpetuate.... If they erred most in the structure of the Union, this is the work
... which has been new modeled by the act ofyour convention and it is this act
on which you are now to deliberate and to decide.13
10. TiE FEDERAUST No. 9, at 73-74 (Alexander Hamilton).
I1. See id. No. 10, at 81-84 (James Madison); id. No. 63 at 386-87 (James Madison).
12. Id. No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
13. Id. No. 14, at 103-05 (James Madison). This passage is especially noteworthy because
2002]
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This immodest vision of what America had already accomplished and could yet
accomplish was hardly unique to Publius. Just pull out a dollar bill and ponder the
great pyramid that appears on the back, wreathed by the proud words "Novus Ordo
Seclorum"--the New Order of the Ages that America would usher in. All this
appeared on the Great Seal of the United States as adopted in 1782, five years before
James Wilson spoke of pyramids in Philadelphia or Publius began publishing in New
York. The pyramid on the Great Seal is unfinished; a top has yet to be erected. So
too, as immense as the nation already was in 1787, the Founders saw it as unfinished
and expected it to grow even bigger. The vast Northwest Territory, stretching all the
way to what is now Indiana, was already part of the Union; and The Federalist clearly
hints at future westward growth, strongly anticipating the early nineteenth-century
ideas of the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny. 4 The Constitution itself leaves
the door wide open for this westward expansion in the broad language of Article IV
discussing federal territories and new states." And in McCulloch we see John
Marshall dreaming big, defining America as a "vast republic, fromthe St. Croix to the
Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific."'6
All this is nothing if not immodest, even epic. The Founders' master plan-to
spread self-government across a continent, raise up a great republic for countless
generations to come, and ultimately induce an unrepublican Old World to follow
America's New World republican example-seems almost fantastical, but for the fact
that so much of it has already come to pass. In 1787, genuine self-government existed
almost nowhere on the planet, and America comprised only a tiny fraction of the
world's population, military might, and econonic power. As late as 1900, it was
hardly clear that, only a century later, freedom and democracy would sweep the globe
as they have done and are now doing.
Thus we cannot explain the modest size of our Constitution's text in terms of the
modesty of its vision. And a quick look beyond the Great Seal to the actual buildings
that the Founders erected confirms their taste for the grandiose. The Capitol building
exists on a scale vastly larger than anything comparable in America-for example, it
is more than fifty times the size of Pennsylvania's initial state house (now known as
Independence Hall). According to the official House Web site:
Today, the Capitol covers a ground area of 175,170 square feet, or about 4
acres, and has a floor area of approximately 16-1/2 acres. Its length, from
north to south, is 751 feet 4 inches; its greatest width, including approaches,
is 350 feet. Its height above the base line on the east front to the top of the
it completes the first major section of The Federalist. Its last words--'you are now to'
deliberate and to decide"--echo and gesture back towards the first sentence ofNumber I ("you
are called upon to deliberate").
14. On westward growth, see for example The Federalist No. 7, at 60-61 (Alexander
Hamilton); id. No. 38, at 239 (James Madison). On the more general foreshadowing of the
Monroe Doctrine in The Federalist, see generallyAkhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons
for the Old World, 58 U. CI. L. REv. 483, 483-90, 490 n.40 (1991).
15. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3 ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union .... The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.
16. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,408 (1819).
[Vol. 77:671
ARCHITEXTURE
Statue of Freedom is 288 feet; from the basement floor to the top of the dome
is an ascent of 365 steps. The building contains approximately 540 rooms and
has 658 windows (108 in the dome alone) and approximately 850 doorways.17
To be sure, the original plan for the Capitol was somewhat less grandiose, but this
plan nonetheless envisioned a building far larger and more splendid than any
governmental building, or any other building for that matter, in early America.
President Washington admired the original plan for the Capitol not only for its
"simplicity and convenience" but also, tellingly, for its "grandeur."'
8
Of course, some of our capital's most celebrated buildings were built on a more
modest scale. The first thing that strikes many modem visitors to the White House is
that it is smaller than they expected. The Lincoln Memorial likewise lacks the
towering scale of the Capitol building or the 555 foot high Washington Monument.
If we ponder places like the White House and the Lincoln Memorial, we can begin
to solve the puzzle of why so big a constitutional vision is housed in so small a text.
The White House is designed to embody a republican idea: America has no Emperor
or King, so the residence of our leader should not look like Windsor Castle or the
Palace of Versailles. It should be a place that does not overawe citizens by its sheer
magnitude. For all its beauty and power, the Lincoln Memorial should likewise be
democratically inviting and accessible, not intimidating. If the Capitol building exists
on an altogether different scale, we must remember that it is not the private residence
of, or a public monument to, one man. Rather, it is the place where a host of
lawmakers from across a vast continent come to deliberate together, an official agora
(especially on the House side) designed to be the People's place-a kind of-
governmental Grand Central Station. Indeed, a smaller Capitol might have
necessitated a smaller-and thus more elite and less representative-set ofdelegates, 9
and might have meant less room in the public galleries for ordinary citizens to come
and watch their representatives in action. The awesome scale of the Capitol facilitates
a large House of Representatives whosemembers can come from and mingle with the
middling classes.2"
Now take this musing about building size and look again at the federal Constitution.
The document was designed, to borrow a phrase, for the People. Ordinary people were
asked to ratify the text and thereby make it law (a point to which I shall repeatedly
return). The text governs ordinary citizens and speaks in their name. Like the Lincoln
17. See The United States Capitol: An Overview of the Building and Its Function,
http:l/www.aoc.gov/cclcapitol/capitol-overview.htm (last visited May 13, 2002). By contrast,
Independence Hall occupies a footprint that is approximately 107 feet by 45 feet, and
comprises two floors of rooms-approximately 10,000 square feet in all. Its spire (including
weathervane) rises to 169 feet. Interview with with Independence Hall architect (January 16,
2002).
18. See Thornton's East Elevation of the Capitol, ca. 1796,
http:lwww.aoc.gov/cccapitol/wt-dwg.htm (last visited May 13, 2002).
19. For a general discussion of the debate about numerical size and representation at the
Founding, see AKH[LREED AMAR, Tim BInLOFRIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 8-17
(1998).
20. According to the House Web site, see supra note 17, the Capitol building is visited by
three to five million persons a year.
2002)
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Memorial, it must be open and inviting. It needed to be compact enough so that
ordinary citizens in 1787 could read it from start to finish to decide whether they were
indeed willing to give it their consent. It is designed so that later generations of
ordinary citizens can continue to read and reread it to learn about their government,
their rights, and their duties, and can ponder possible constitutional amendments that
might be proposed.
Recall once again the architectural images summoned up by Wilson, Madison,
Hamilton, and Marshall. All of these founders spoke not only of erecting a mighty
edifice, but also of basing that edifice on the foundation of the people." Thus, the
Constitution had to be written compactly so as to be understandable by ordinary folk.
This, in fact, is what John Marshall said in one of the most quoted and least
understood passages in all of constitutional law. "A constitution," wrote Marshall,
cannot properly "partake of the prolixity of a legal code." Why not? Because such
a code "would probably never be understood by the public."' As an inherently
populist document-establishing a government "of the people," "from" them, "by"
them, "on" them, and "for" them-the Constitution by its very "nature, therefore,
requires that only its great outlines should be marked .... [W]e must never forget it
is a constitution we are expounding."24
By directing our attention to textual scale, architexture helps us see how the
Constitution's small size aims to implement its big idea: popular sovereignty. Text
size also has profound implications for some of the Constitution's other major themes,
such as federalism, separation of powers, and rights.
As a matter of federalism, the contrast between the federal Constitution and some
state constitutions suggests that state constitutions maybe somewhat less populist than
conventionally thought. Because state constitutions are generally easy to amend, and
are in fact frequently amended, by the citizens themselves via initiative and
referendum, these constitutions might seem unambiguously more populist than the
federal text. But the added verbiage in state charters makes them harder for ordinary
citizens to read and understand. Along this axis, the federal Constitution would seem
more accessible to the general public and thus, more populist.
But even though the federal Constitution was designed to be an open and inviting
textual edifice, how many citizens today in fact take advantage of the invitation?
Millions of Americans visit Washington, D.C., each year and tour its great buildings.
How many visit the Constitution itself and tour its remarkable precincts? Most
layfolk-and even, I suspect, most lawyers-have never spent the mere half hour that
it would take to read the document from start to finish. How many Americans could
quote from memory any two of the ten amendments that make up America's vaunted
Bill of Rights?
Our inattention to the exact text of the Bill is especially ironic given that it is written
so as to facilitate popular memorization, encompassing easily remembered and
21. See supra text at notes 2-5.
22. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819)
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 404-05,407 (emphasis in original). For a similar reading of these passages, see
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELUIGIBLE CoNsTrrTToN 1-3 (1992).
[V/ol. 77:671
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internalized maxims of government, pithily put.' According to the opening chapter
of the bestselling book in Revolutionary America after the Bible, schoolboys in
ancient Rome "were obliged to learn the twelve tables by heart."' And speaking of
the Bible, it was of course common at the time of the Founding-and in some places
still remains common-for children to memorize passages of Scripture. Likewise,
many Founders expected that a didactic Bill of Rights "will be the first lesson of the
young citizens."27 Both ordinary citizens and lawmakers could be expected to keep the
document close to their hearts-quite literally, as Thomas Paine explained in
describing the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776:
It was the political bible of the state. Scarcely a family was without it. Every
member of the government had a copy; and nothing was more common, when
any debate arose on the principle of a bill, or on the extent of any species of
authority, than for the members to take the printed constitution out of their
pocket, and read the chapter with which [such] debate was connected?
This is not to say that educated Americans today do not have a general sense of their
constitutional rights. But that general sense, and much of the specific vocabulary,
comes more from the Supreme Court than from the Constitution itself. Following the
Court, layfolk often speak of the "separation of church and state" even though those
words do not quite appear in the First Amendment; and the Miranda mantra has
displaced the actual wording of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Lawyers speak
unselfconsciously about "substantive due process" or "strict scrutiny" as if the
Constitution really used these words.
A quick look at constitutional text and history suggests that the Framers envisioned
rather less reliance on the Supreme Court, and rather more constitutional conversation
within the legislature and among the citizens. No phrase appears more in the Bill of
Rights than the words, "the people"--words that of course also have pride of place in
the Preamble. (The recurrent use of these words is, from an architextural point of
view, one of the document's dominant motifs.) The document nowhere gives the
Supreme Court a monopoly on constitutional interpretation or proclaims it to be "the
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"--a phrase that also is absent from Marbury
v. Madison and that never appeared in US. Reports until the second half of the
twentieth century.29
25. See AMf, supra note 19, at 131-32 and sources cited therein.
26. 1 WIauAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *6.
27. Letter from a Delegate Who Has Catched Cold, VA. INDEP. CHRON. June 18, 1788 and
June 25, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE CoMPLETE ANTi-FEDERAUST 268, 273 (Herbert J. Storing
ed., 1981).
28. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 182 (Heritage Press 1961) (1791).
29. This phrase first appeared in an opinion of the Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211 (1962). Cf Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (proclaiming, in a context involving
state defiance of the Court's mandate rather than congressional or presidential disagreement
with the Court's judgment, that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube. Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (describing "judicial process as the ultimate authority in
interpreting the Constitution").
2002]
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Today's Supreme Court takes up vastly more constitutional space than the one
established in 1789. In the almost eighty years between the Founding and the
Reconstruction, the Supreme Court invalidated acts of Congress on only two
occasions, MarburA° in 1803 and Dred Scot?3 ' in 1857. By the mid-1920s, this
number had risen to about fifty-less than one case a year.32 As of 1930, the Court had
never invalidated any governmentpractice in the name of freedom of expression; and
the first time the Court struck down an act of Congress on First Amendment grounds
was in 1965."3 Overall, the Warren Court invalidated acts ofCongress in about twenty
cases over a sixteen year span-slightly more than one case a year.' By contrast, the
Rehnquist Court in the last seven terms alone struck down congressional laws (most
of them constitutionally sound laws, in my view) in almost thirty cases35 -far more
than in any prior period. From 1995 to 2001, the Court used the First Amendment
doctrine to strike down state and federal policies (many of them quite constitutionally
defensible and some of them even admirable, I should add) in more than twenty
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803).
31. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
32. For details, see CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME
COURT 134-35 (1925).
33. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
34. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Kinsella v. United States,
361 U.S. 234 (1960); Kennedyv. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Schneiderv. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163 (1964); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Lamont, 381 U.S.
at 301; United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969);
35. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995); Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996); United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997); City
of Boerne v. Fiores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Feltnerv. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. 523 U.S. 340
(1998); United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998); Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998); Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison,'529 U.S. 598
(2000); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000);'Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955
(2001); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514 (2001); United States v. Hatter, 121 S. Ct. 1782 (2001); United States v. United Foods,
Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001)).
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separate lawsuits 6
The Supreme Court's rise over the years can also be seen in actual bricks-and-
mortar architecture. The Court did not even have its own building until the 1930s.
When the nation's capital was relocated to Washington, D.C., in 1800, the Court met
in a small room in the Capitol building. After the Capitol was burned in the War of
1812, the Court was eventually moved into a courtroom in a basement under the
Senate chamber, where it sat for four decades. In 1860, the Senate moved into a newer
room, and the Court moved upstairs into the old Senate chamber, where itmet for the
next seventy-five years.
Now all this wasn't quite right, symbolically. As I shall later elaborate, the
architecture of constitutional text envisions three separate and coequal
departments-legislative, executive and judicial. Thus, it is apt that today's Supreme
Court sits not under the Senate or anywhere else in the Capitol building, but rather in
its own edifice, level with the Capitol and the White House--three separate and equal
(though different) buildings for three separate and equal (though different) branches.
But I wonder whether the Court building today goes too far in the direction of
judicial aggrandizement. The problem is notso muchthebuilding itself-though some
might ask why nine Justices need such an imposing marble temple to do their work."
The real problem lies not with the architect, but with the Justices. They are failing to
administer the building in a manner most consistent with the Constitution's basic ideas
of popular sovereignty and republican equality. When you or I, as members of the
general public and sovereign people, seek to go to this building to watch our public
servants in action by attending an oral argument-a public proceeding in open
court-we (the people!) are treated rather curiously. According to Court rules, you are
not even permitted, while sitting in Court, to take out a pencil or pen and write a note
to yourself about what you have just heard. No notes allowed!"' If this isn't technical
36. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. at 454; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Rubin, 514 U.S. at 476; Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515
U.S. 819 (1995); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. at 604; Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at
727; Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 173; Playboy Entn't Group, 529 U.S. at 803; Santa Fe Ind.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000);
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 533; Bartnicki, 532
U.S. at 514; Good News Club v. Milford Cent. School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); United Foods,
Inc., 533 U.S. at 405; Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
37. According to the Court's official Web site, the building measures 385 feet by304 feet.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/courtbuilding.pdf (last visited May 9, 2002).
38. Visitor's Guide to Oral Argument at the Supreme Court of the United States,
http:llwww.supremecourtus.gov/visiting/visitorsguidetooralargument.pdf(last visited May 9,
2002). The House and Senate galleries are subject to similar rules, but imitation does not equal
justification. Moreover, much of the Congress's business is done in committee hearings where
notetaking is generally permitted, and before television cameras, see infra text at note44. Also,
the Congressional Record, published daily and freely available on the Internet, offers a
verbatim transcript of public proceedings on the floor. See GPO Access, at
http:llwww.access.gpo.gov/su-docstindex.html.
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prior restraint, it is uncomfortably close-especially when we remember that the
history of prior restraint is tightly intertwined with judicial use (and abuse) of the
power to punish contempt of court. 9 Shouldn't the Justices treat the people who pay
for this Court with more respect?
By way of comparison, a phone survey conducted in early 2002 reveals that none
of the thirteen United States Courts of Appeals bans notetaking by members of the
general public; nor does the highest court of any state, or of the District of Columbia.
The Supreme Court of Canada likewise allows notetaking by ordinary visitors.'
And for those of us across this vast continent who cannot easily pop over to
Washington, D.C., at the drop of a hat, it seems unfortunate that the Justices do not
allow us to monitor what happens in open court via new technologies like radio,
television, and the Internet. Granted, allowing cameras in the Court might raise some
problems. Lawyers might posture and play to the camera so as to drum up business
from the folks back home; the commercial nightly news might broadcast short clips
out of context, thereby discouraging candid oral argument; and the Justices might lose
some privacy as their faces become more publicly recognizable. But televising Court
proceedings uncut and commercial-free on C-SPAN-much as C-SPAN now helps
beamcongressional proceedings into familyrooms across America-would minimize
these problems. (CPAC, the Canadian counterpart of C-SPAN, regularly televises oral
argument in the Canadian Supreme Court.) Even if TV should be barred, why
shouldn't National Public Radio be allowed to cover oral arguments, live (again, uncut
and commercial-free)? Why shouldn't the Court itselfpost a free transcript of the oral
argument on its official Web site immediately-within minutes-so that any interested
citizen in America can in real time see who said what in open Court?4 Given that the
Court building itself cannot accommodate more than a few hundred persons-or to
be more blunt, given that the building itself devotes too little space for the citizen
gallery and too much space to other, less democratic functions-why shouldn't the
public have electronic access to what is, after all, a public event conducted by public
servants with public money? And so again I ask, shouldn't the Justices treat the people
who pay for this Court with more respect?
Another question: does the Court's treatment of the people in its building mirror
its treatment of the People (with a capital We) in its caselaw? A short document must
perforce leave a great deal to be worked out and specified later, and the Founders
envisioned a system in which all branches of government and the people themselves
would be part of an extended constitutional conversation interpreting and
implementing the document's grand design. Different branches of government might
have different views, and the people themselves-at the ballot box, in the jurybox and
elsewhere-would often play a decisive role in the unfolding democratic drama.
But the Court increasingly has come to assert a monopoly of interpretive power and
39. See AMAR, supra note 19, at 23-24.
40. Phone survey by Richard Albert (February, 2002) (data on file with author). In Rhode
Island, notetakers must seek permission from the court clerk, who typically grants such
permission pro forma. Id.
41. Typically, the oral argument transcript is posted on the official Court Web site about
seven to ten days after the event. See generally Argument Transcripts, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral.arguments/argument-transcripts.html.
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has often treated the Constitution itselfin cavalier ways. Perhaps the most famous case
of the modem era, Roe v. Wade,42 never even quotes the words of the Constitution that
it claims are violated by antiabortion laws. And when we look at these words, they
speak of "due process of law," not "due substance of law" or, as the Court would have
it, "substantive due process." Instead of expounding the People's Constitution, today's
caselaw often eclipses it, substituting the Court's own words for the Constitution's and
proclaiming the Justices' general right-their duty, even-to ignore the Constitution
in many situations when the Constitution has the effrontery to conflict with the Court's
precedents.43 The Court's law as expressed in doctrine is increasingly displacing the
People's law as expressed in the Constitution itself. We, the People, are being
displaced by them, the Justices." It was precisely to forestall this displacement that
the Founders crafted a short document that every citizen could read, understand, and
in various ways (as a voter, as ajuror) help interpret-a document founded onpopular
sovereignty rather than judicial supremacy, a document beginning with the majestic
words, "We, the People ......
II. THE GREAT PORTAL
Which brings us to the Preamble. Just as we typically take note of a grand
entranceway to some great building as we enter it, so too when we visit the
Constitution architexturally, we should immediately pause and ponder the majestic
textual arch ushering us inward. 'We, the People of theUnited States... do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
Note that I have omitted the words in the middle of this sentence to reduce it to its
grammatical essence of subject, verb, and object. I shall come to the omitted words
soon enough, but for now please consider just how remarkable a sentence this is,
stripped to the essentials. Here is the monumental idea fronting the monumental
document: popular sovereignty. All ye who enter, pay heed. This text comes from the
People.
It is fashionable today to miss this point or mock it by emphasizing all the
Founding-era exclusions-of slaves, of women, of free blacks and unpropertied men.
Much of this criticism is valid, and I shall eventually return to the issue of democratic
exclusion. But what this criticism misses is that at the time the Preamble's words are
written, the Constitution can indeed lay claim to being the most populist document the
world has yet seen. Ancient democracies had likewise excluded slaves and women;
and no ancient democracy had ever democratically voted on its basic constitution
itself. The celebrated (and partly monarchical) English Constitution had never been
reduced to writing and voted on; and ordinary Americans had never been asked to
ratify the Declaration of Independence, or the state constitutions of 1776, or the
Articles of Confederation.45 As Americans debated the Constitution in 1787 and 1788,
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,864 (1992).
44. For a more general discussion of the gaps between the document and the doctrine
purporting to construe it, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword:
The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 26 (2000).
45. Massachusetts in 1780 and New Hampshire in 1784 did secure popular ratification of
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they understood-and so must we today-the stunning fact that never before in the
history of planet earth had so many ordinary persons been directly involved in
registering their explicit consent to the supreme law under which they and their
posterity would be governed.
In dramatic contrast to ancient Republics founded by one lawgiver-Athens's
Solon, or Sparta's Lycurgus-America's Constitution was drafted by a representative
assembly and then put to a vote by popularly elected convention in each state. Leading
founders were acutely aware and immensely proud of America's innovation. James
Wilson could scarcely contain himself:
A people free and enlightened, establishing and ratifying a system of
government, which theyhave previouslyconsidered, examined, and approved!
This is a spectacle, which we are assembled to celebrate; and it is the most
dignified one that has yet appeared on our globe....
... A whole people exercising its first and greatest power-pefforming an act
of sovereignty, original and unlimited!
The scene before us is unexampled as well as magnificent. The greatest part
ofgovemments have been the deformed offspring of force and fear. With these
we deign not comparison. But there have been others which have formed bold
pretensions to higher regard. You have heard of Sparta, of Athens, and of
Rome; you have heard of their admired constitutions, and of their high-prized
freedom.... But did they, in all their pomp and pride of liberty, ever furnish,
to the astonished world, an exhibition similar to that which we now
contemplate? Were their constitutions framed by those, who were appointed
for that purpose, by the people? After they were framed, were they submitted
to the consideration of the people? Had the people an opportunity of
expressing their sentiments concerning them? Were they to stand or fall by the
people's approving or rejecting vote?6
The Preamble does not merely affirm popular sovereignty; it embodies and enacts
it. It performs it. We, the People, in fact do something-we ordain and establish, we
make, we found, we erect, we constitute. Our Constitution is a deed and not just a text,
and it is the Preamble (as further specified by Article VII, to which I shall return) that
does the deed.
And the Preamble does all this on a continental scale. It unites previously separate
and "sovereign" states that had been bound together in a "league," a "firm [but mere]
treaty of friendship" into something altogether different, into a continental nation. In
their proposed state constitutions; the federal Constitution built on and continentally extended
these two precedents.
46. 2 JAMES WILSON, Oration Delivered on the Fourth ofJuly, 1788, at the Procession
Formed at Philadelphia, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 773, 773-74 (Robert Green
McCloskey ed., 1967). A similar, if more rhetorically restrained, meditation appears in The
Federalist No. 38, at 231 (James Madison). For important recent scholarship calling attention
to this aspect of America's innovation, see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 13, 163-68 (2001).
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a phrase, it "form[s] a more perfect Union."'
In announcing this as its literally primary purpose, the Preamble clearlyputs diehard
believers in absolute state sovereignty on notice. Abandon that hope, ye who enter
here. The phrase "perfect Union" in fact echoes language from the Union of England
and Scotland in 1707, as Publius reminds his readers in The Federalist No. 5.4S As
with that union creating a United Kingdom, the Preamble proposes to unite the several
states into a legal order that will not permit unilateral secession later on. 9
The rest of the Preamble's language likewise suggests a much stronger national
system than had existed under the Articles of Confederation. The opening words of
the Articles had affirmed a "confederacy" in which "[e]ach state retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence."5 Nothing of the sort appears inthe opening
words of the Constitution. Whereas the Articles spoke ofthe "states" promoting "their
common defence, the security of their liberties[,] and their mutual and general
welfare,"'" the Preamble rephrases these words in a more nationalistic way, and
presents them as part of a grand portico of nationalistic purpose: "to form a perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity." This graceful colonnade speaks not merely of relations between
states, but of direct national aims within each state-justice and domestic
tranquility-and of a direct relationship between a national people and our national
Constitution.
Antifederalists hurled themselves against this gate, but ultimately lost the debate.
"Who authorized [the Philadelphia convention] to speak the language of, We, the
people, instead of, We, thestates?" asked PatrickHenry.' "States," he continued, "are
the characteristics and the soul of a confederation. If states be not the agents of this
compact, it must be one great, consolidated, national government of the people of all
the states."' In a more architectural vein, states' rightist Sam Adams confessed: "[A]s
I enter the Building[,] I stumble at the Threshold. I meet with a National Government,
instead of a Federal Union of Sovereign States."'  Likewise, Pennsylvania
47. For more elaboration and documentation of this reading, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1442-62 (1987) [hereinafter Amar, Of
Sovereignty]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
OutsideArticle V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457,462-69 & n.37 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent];
Akhil Reed Amar, Abraham Lincoln and the American Union, 2001 Ill. L. Rev. 1109
[hereinafter Amar, Lincoln].
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 5, at 50 (John Jay) (quoting letter of July 1, 1706, from Queen
Anne to Scotch Parliament).
49. See I WILuAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *98 n.e (note added in 1766); see
generally Amar, Of Sovereignty, supra note 47, at 1451-62; Amar, Lincoln, supra note 47, at
1124-30.
50. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, arts. I-IlL.
51. id. art. III.
52. 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 22 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
AYER Co., Publishers, Inc. reprint ed. 1987) (1888) [hereinafter Elliot's Debates].
53. Id.
54. Letter to R.H. Lee, December 3, 1787, in 4 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 324
(Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., Octagon Books, Inc. 1968) (1908).
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Antifederalist Robert Whitehill complained that the Preamble "shows [that] the old
foundation of the union is destroyed, the principle of confederation [is] excluded, and
a new and unwieldy system of consolidated empire is set up[]on the ruins of the
present compact between the states."55
As an affirmation and enactment of continental popular sovereignty on an utterly
unprecedented scale, the Preamble deserves pride of place in constitutional law and
constitutional theory. It is no coincidence that the three greatest opinions ofAmerica's
three greatest Founding-era Justices-James Wilson's Chisholm v. Georgia,56 Joseph
Story's Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,57 and John Marshall's McCulloch v.
Maryland'--each features a prominent discussion of the Preamble. Nor is it
surprising that America's greatest lawyer-President, Abraham Lincoln, built his
constitutional Church of Union upon the rock of the Preamble.59 What is surprising,
and sad, is that citizens, lawyers, and judges today pay rather little attention to the
Preamble. Rarely in the last fifty years has a majority opinion of the Supreme Court
even cast a glance at the Constitution's great gateway arch, much less offered any
detailed discussion of what is inscribed on this gate, and why we should still care.
III. FACING THE FUTURE
So much for the building's front portal. Let's now examine the back.
In 1787, the Constitution ended with Article VII, which proclaims that "The
ratification of the conventions of nine states, shall be sufficient for the establishment
of this Constitution between the states so ratifying the same."
This article was gracefully designed to complement and counterbalance the
Preamble, much as a classical building features certain pleasing symmetries.
Locationally, Article VII at the Founding was the omega to the Preamble's alpha-an
eyecatching last word complementing the Preamble's first principles. (Had Article VII
been placed anywhere else-except alongside the Preamble itself, prior to Article
I-it would have been less architexturally prominent, and its linkage to the Preamble
likewise would have been less immediately evident.) Substantively, both the front and
the back portals concretize popular sovereignty. The Preamble proclaims that "We,
the people... do ordain and establish this Constitution." Article VII specifies how,
precisely, We do this, via state ratifying conventions. Textually, Article VII even
echoes the exact wording of the Preamble, explaining how "this Constitution" is to be
"establish[ed]."
If the Preamble has profound implications for constitutional law and theory, then
so too does Article VII. Why were "conventions" under Article VII seen as
embodiments of the Preamble's "We, the People"? In what ways were such
conventions decisively different from ordinary legislatures? Why did the Constitution
55. Quoted in ALPHEUS THoMAs MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE: ANTIFEDERALISM
AND THE CoNsTrruTmON 135 (2d ed. 1975).
56. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,454,462-63 (1793) (separate opinion of Wilson, J.); see also
id. at 471 (separate opinion of Jay, C.J.).
57. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324-25 (1816).
58. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-05 (1819).
59. See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address-Final Text (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 265 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1953).
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go into effect only among the states that ratified it? Given that when George
Washington took office, North Carolina and Rhode Island had yet to ratify the
Constitution, how would the new Union have unfolded had these two states persisted
in remaining outside the Constitution? How can Article VII be squared with the
Articles of Confederation, which proclaimed that any new regime would require the
unanimous consent of the thirteen state legislatures? How could a simple majority
within a state ratifying convention in effect alter preexisting state constitutional norms
without complying with the explicit rules of amendment specified in these state
constitutions?
Thoughtful students of the Constitution may disagree about the answers to these
profound questions, but surprisingly few lawyers and judges today even ask them. The
modem Supreme Court has rarely wrestled with any of these questions or tried to
explain the general significance of Article VII for deep constitutional principles of
federalism, popular sovereignty, representation, majority rule, and constitutional
amendment6
Of course, Article VII was far more architexturally prominent in the Constitution's
original design than in its remodeled form. This article ended the 1787 Constitution,
but it sits in the middle of the 2002 version. What began as a back porch is now a
passageway of sorts, linking the great acts of popular sovereignty in the 1780s to
subsequent acts of popular sovereignty by later generations of Americans-the
Preamble's "posterity."
The architextural configuration of these later popular pronouncements is striking.
Rather than directly rewriting the original 1787 text-the way a modem
wordprocessor reworks an old draft-Americans have chosen instead to add new texts
to the end of the document in chronological order, Each new amendment builds out
fromits predecessor, beginning with Article VII and stretching towards the horizon.
The architextural effect is to call dramatic attention to the arc of history, the
chronological unfolding of constitutional law tracking the unfolding narrative of the
American people. Readers can see at a glance, for example, how democracy is on the
march, how later amendments seek to make amends for-without hiding-earlier
democratic exclusions and other lapses. Over the years, by working to redeem the
Preamble's boasts of democracy and liberty, We, the People, re-earn the right to call
ourselves that without embarrassment. We, the People, mature and expand alongside
a maturing and expanding constitutional text. We add a bill of rights; we abolish
slavery; we proclaim equal citizenship and bring states to heel; we enfranchise black
men, then all women, then the poor and young adults; we embrace progressive income
taxation and direct election of Senators; we shorten lame-duck Congresses, and limit
imperial Presidents to two terms.6' And we are not yet done.
60. For my own efforts to assess these issues in light of Article VII, see generally Amar,
OfSovereignty, supra note 47, at 1459-62; Atnar, Consent, supra note 47; Akhil Reed Amar,
The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and
the Denominator Problem, 65 U. ColO. L. REv. 749, 761 (1994).
61. See U.S. CONsT amends. I-X (establishing a Bill of Rights); XIII (abolishing slavery);
XIV (proclaiming equal citizenship andbringing states to heel);XV (enfranchising'blackmen);
XVI (authorizing predictably progressive income tax); XVII (guaranteeing direct election of
Senators); XIX (enfranchising women); XX (limiting lame duck periods); XXII (limiting
Presidents to two terms); XXIV (prohibiting poll taxes for federal elections); XXVI
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This dramatic visual image of a Constitution moving forward and stretching toward
the horizon has, I think, been missed by most lawyers and judges. Advocates of a
"living Constitution" often think more about living than about the Constitution. They
pay little attention to the obvious ways in which the document indeed does move
forward and change shape, via amendment. At the other end of the methodological
spectrum, manyself-described textualists exaggerate the Founding text and slight later
amendments. Neither side has paid much attention to the trend line of these
amendments, to the arc of history showcased by the text itself.2
Had Americans opted to rewrite the Founding text rather than adding amendments
to the end in chronological order, the pattern and direction of textual change would
have been less visible. It would have been harder to see at glance that, for example,
over the years We, the People, have embraced increasingly strong claims of civil and
political equality even as We have scaled back protections for the rich. We freed
slaves without compensating slaveholders in the 1860s;' embraced a predictably
progressive income tax in the 1910s; and banned various poll taxes in the 1960s. And
"the people" who did all this were more representative in key ways than the more
exclusionary "people" of the Founding. Yet many of those who claim fidelity to
constitutional text miss all this, in part because they pay. no heed to the very
shape-the architexture-of that text. Misreading both individual clauses and the
document's evolving structure, these self-described textualists overprotect property,
underprotect democracy, and ignore the textual trend line altogether.
History, of course, is still happening. Had amendments been blended into the
original text, the document might seemperfect and complete, as is. But the manner of
adding amendments to the end reminds us that we ourselves-We, the People
today-should ponder how we might leave our posterity a better document than we
inherited. Why only twenty-seven amendments, as opposed to twenty-eight, or twenty-
nine, or ...? The obvious incompleteness and openendedness of the Constitution as
a perpetual work in progress is thus dramatized by a series of amendments pointing
outward toward the horizon, facing the future.
Or to switch the spacial metaphor from the horizontal to the vertical, note how each
amendment text is layered atop its predecessors in a perpetually unfinished pyramid,
gesturing upwards. The blank space at the top is a constant reminder to us that the
document is not finished. We, the People, still have work to do."
(enfranchising young adults).
62. The most prominent exception here is John Hart Ely, whose celebrated Harris Lecture
(which later became part of his landmark book) did indeed seek to call attention to the obvious
democratizing trendline of post-Founding constitutional amendments. See John Hart Ely,
Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 410-11 (1978);
JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 6-7, 99, 123 (1980). Also worthy of note here
is Jed Rubenfeld's brilliant new book, supra note 46, which conceptualizes the American
Constitution as a written project worked out over a large stretch of time.
63. Above and beyond the Thirteenth Amendment itself, note that Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state and federal governments from compensating
slaveholders for emancipation. This stem prohibition applied even to loyal slaveholders from
loyal (nonseceding) states.
64. "The architects of These States laid their foundations, and passed to further spheres.
... Now are needed other architects, whose duty is not less difficult, but perhaps more difficult.
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IV. PRESERVING THE PAST
One further aspect of the Constitution's chronologically structured text deserves
notice. We, the People, have made amends without hiding or whitewashing our past
mistakes. Rather than prying loose and carting off embarrassing textual remnants of
American's imperfect history, like the Fugitive Slave Clause or the Three-Fifths
Clause, We, the People, have added on new rooms to the old edifice. No whitewash:
the old mistake remains in place and in view as a lesson to all. If anything, America's
mode of remodeling invites special attention to these later-abandoned clauses. As
readers explore a given amendment in the New Wing, we must identify which parts
of the Old Wing (and which portions of earlier add-ons)"5 are consequently no longer
fully functional. If today's lawyers and judges were to spend more time pondering
these lapsed clauses, we would see our current constitutional situation in a clearer
light.
Take the electoral college. The very architextural presence of the Twelfth
Amendment separate and detached from Article II calls attention to the Philadelphia
Framers' now superceded Article II presidential system. That system failed to
anticipate the rise of national presidential parties, and thus needed to be replaced.'
This fact alone might prompt us to ask, what other important future developments did
the Philadelphia Founders fail to anticipate? Perhaps there are other repair jobs that
need to be done by the American people today?
The Twelfth Amendment, standing alone and bearing its own special date apart
from all other constitutional texts, also calls attention to itself in a way that direct
rewording of Article II might not have. Viewing this standalone amendment, we are
prompted to ask why, when dealing with a flawed Founding system of presidential
selection, Americans in 1803 didn't'simply scrap the electoral college system
altogether in favor of direct popular election? And the answer to this archtitexurallly
prompted question turns out to have important lessons for today's world.
Most of the reasons that had been given for the electoral college in 1787 made much
less sense in 1803. Some founders had defended the original electoral college as a sop
to small states. Yet the elections of 1796 and 1800 had made clear that the real
Each age forever needs architects. America is not finished, perhaps neverwill be; now America
is a divine true sketch." WALT WHITMAN, To RALPH WALDO EMERSON, LEAVES OF GRASS (2d
ed. 1856).
65. See, for example, the Twenty-first Amendment, explicitly repealing the earlier
Eighteenth Amendment, which had constitutionalized Prohibition.
66. In the election of 1800-01, two rudimentary presidential parties-Federalists led by
John Adams and Republicans led byoomas Jefferson-took shape and squared off. Jefferson
ultimately prevailed, but only after an extended crisis triggered by several glitches in the
Framers' electoral machinery. In particular, Republican electors had no formal wayto designate
that they wanted Jefferson for President and Aaron Burr for Vice President rather than vice
versa. Some politicians then tried to exploit the resulting confusion. Enter the Twelfth
Amendment, which allowed each party to designate one candidate for president and a separate
candidate for vice president. The Amendment transformed the Framers' framework, enabling
future presidential elections to be openly populist and partisan affairs featuring two competing
tickets.
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division in America ran not between big and small states, but between Northern and
Southern states. What's more, the modem system of national presidential parties and
winner-take-all state elections-a system already visible, though not yet entrenched,
at the time of the Twelfth Amendment-largely nullified any advantage that small
states might have had under the Philadelphia plan.67 Of the forty-two men to hold the
Presidency, only two, Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire and Bill Clinton of
Arkansas, have run as small state residents.
Some Philadelphia framers objected to direct presidential election because they
believed that ordinary Americans across a vast continent would lack sufficient
information to choose intelligently among leading presidential candidates. Although
voters in a given state would know enough to choose between leading state candidates
for House races and for the governorship, these voters would likely lack information
about which out-of-state figure would be best for the presidency. But by the time of
the Twelfth Amendment, this concern was quickly becoming moot. National
presidential parties would link presidential candidates to slates of local candidates and
national platforms would explain to voters who stood for what.
The real problem with direct election, both in 1787 and 1803, was altogether
different. In a word: slavery. At the Philadelphia convention, the visionary
Pennsylvanian James Wilson proposed direct national election of the President." But
in a key speech on July 19, 1787, the savvy Virginian James Madison suggested that
such a system would prove unacceptable to the South: "The right of suffrage was
much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could
have no influence in the election on the score of Negroes."'69 In other words, in a direct
election system, the North would outnumber the South, whose many slaves (more than
halfa million in all) of course could not vote. But the electoral college-a prototype
of which Madison proposed in this same speech-instead let each Southern state
count its slaves, albeit with a two-fifths discount, in computing its share of the overall
electoral college.
Virginia emerged as the big winner-the California of the Founding era-with
twelve out of a total of ninety-one electoral votes allocated by the Philadelphia
Constitution, more than a quarter of the forty-six needed to win in the first round.7 °
After the 1800 census, Wilson's free state of Pennsylvania had ten percent more free
persons than Virginia, but got twenty percent fewer electoral votes. Perversely, the
more slaves Virginia (or any other slave state) bought or bred, the more electoral votes
67. The key Philadelphia concession to small states was the Framers' backup selection
system: if no candidate emerged with a first-round electoral-vote majority, then the House of
Representatives would choose among the top five finalists, with each state casting one vote,
regardless of population. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 3. Some framers expected that big states
would tend to dominate the first round, while small states might loom large in the final
selection. But under a system of two major presidential parties, one candidate almost always
wins an electoral majority in the first round, rendering the Framers' pro-small-state backup
system irrelevant. Nor is the first round strongly skewed against big states. Whatever small-
state skew results from the rule giving every state a minimum of three electoral votes is largely
offset by winner-take-all rules tending to favor big states.
68. 1 THE RECORDS, supra note 2, at 68 (June 1).
69. 2 THE RECORDS, supra note 2, at 56-57.
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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it would receive. Were a slave state to free any blacks who then moved to the North,
the state could actually lose electoral votes. If the system's proslavery tilt was not
overwhelmingly obvious when the Constitution was ratified, it quicklybecame so. For
thirty-two of the Constitution's first thirty-six years, a white slaveholding Virginian
occupied the Presidency.
Most importantly, the proslavery skew was plainly visible when the Twelfth
Amendment was framed and ratified. The 1796 race between John Adams of
Massachusetts and Thomas Jefferson of Virginia had featured a razor-sharp division
between Northern states and Southern states. Adams won that one, but in the rematch
four years later Jefferson prevailed, with the slavery-skew of the electoral college as
the decisive margin of victory. Without the extra electoral college votes generated by
slavery, the mostly Southern states that supported Jefferson would not have sufficed
to give him a majority. As pointed observers remarked at the time, Thomas Jefferson
metaphorically rode into the executive mansion on the backs of slaves. Thus, when the
Twelfth Amendment tinkered with the electoral college system rather than tossing it,
the system's proslavery bias was hardly a secret. Indeed, in the floor debate over the
amendment in late 1803, Massachusetts Congressman Samuel Thatcher complained
that "[t]he representation of slaves adds thirteen members to this House in the present
Congress, and eighteen Electors of President and Vice President at the next
election."' But Thatcher's complaint went unredressed. As it had at Philadelphia, the
North caved to the South by refusing to insist on direct national election.
Still later amendments highlight the gender exclusions that were also facilitated by
the early electoral college. After the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery,
Southern states were eligible to count all their blacks for purposes of congressional
representation and the electoral college, without any two-fifths discount, even though
these states did not yet allow blacks to vote. Unless the Constitution were amended,
Southern states would actually have more national clout after Appomattox than they
had before secession! To prevent this, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
devised anew apportionment formula whichput the word "male" into the Constitution
for the first time. In essence, a state that disfranchised any of its adult male citizens
would have its congressional apportionment and electoral college allotment
proportionately reduced.72 But no state would pay any price, in Congress or in the
electoral college, for disfranchising adult women citizens! Then came the Fifteenth
Amendment giving black men the vote but doing nothing for women. Only with the
adoption ofthe Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 did We, the People, vest women with
full and equal voting rights. These later amendments-all the more prominent because
71. 13 Annals of Cong. 538 (Oct. 28, 1803).
72.
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a state, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in anyway abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis ofrepresentation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall
bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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simply been hidden in the Old Wing-draw attention to an obvious (in retrospect)
defect of the early electoral college: The Founding fathers' system didn't do much for
the Founding mothers. Under direct national election, any state that chose to
enfranchise its women would have automatically doubled its clout in presidential
elections. (New Jersey apparently did allow some women to vote in the Founding era,
but later abandoned the practice.) Under the electoral college, however, a state had no
special incentive to expand suffrage-each state got a fixed number of electoral votes
based on population, regardless of how many or how few citizens were allowed to
vote or actually voted. As with slaves, what mattered was simply how many women
resided in a state, not how many could vote there.
What should this constitutional narrative-made easier to see and tell precisely
because the text of the original electoral college remains open to view, and the
amendments are nicely arranged in chronological order-mean forjudges and citizens
today?
Start with the judiciary. The best-known case concerning the electoral college and
its workings is, of course, Bush v. Gore.73 The facts of this case involved rather
serious inequalities in voting machinery within the state of Florida. Certain districts
with large black and/or poor populations disproportionately had outdated and ill-
maintained voting machines that resulted in an extraordinarily high percentage of
uncounted ballots, compared to other-whiter, richer-parts of the state with sleeker
and more reliable voting systems. The case turned on the meaning of both Founding-
era rules about presidential selection and Reconstruction-era principles concerning
equality.
In such a case, I would have liked to see at least one Justice tell Americans the basic
story of race- and class-based exclusion in the original electoral college, and of the
American People's subsequent-imperfect and unfinished but commendable-efforts
to make amends. This story would have begun by noting that the electoral college was
largely designed in 1787 and revised in 1803 to facilitate black disfranchisement. The
story would have noted that although We, the People, formally repudiated racial
inequality in voting in the Fifteenth Amendment, the Justices largely turned a blind
eye when the provisions of that Amendment (along with Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment) were defied on a massive scale for much of the next century.74 Until
Congress got serious in 1965 with an important voting rights statute that went far
beyond what the Court had done,7 vast numbers of blacks were wholly disfranchised
in much of the former Confederacy. The story might have mentioned that via the
Twenty-fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964, We, the People, prohibited poll taxes in
presidential elections in an effort to equalize voting rights between rich and poor. The
story would have also noticed that blacks and poor persons in many areas-including
Florida-continue to suffer from unequal voting opportunities and machinery. And
the story might have concluded that this background narrative, tracking the changing
constitutional text itself and the unfolding saga of the American people, was relevant
in assessing efforts to recount votes in those Florida counties with especially high
73. 531 U.S. 98 (2000)
74. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
75. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb (1994)).
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percentages ofundercounted votes. Given the large initial undercount, and its systemic
race- and class-based skew, efforts to minimize this undercount via mildly imperfect
recounts should not lightly be deemed unconstitutional; indeed, any imperfections and
inequalities introduced by the recount appeared likely to be much smaller than those
of the initial count, and the recount inequalities did not appear to have any systemic
race- or class-based skew.
Alas, not a single Justice told this story.
Now turn from the Justices to the American citizenry. In light of the less than
flattering history of the electoral college, Americans should ask themselves whether
we want to maintain this peculiar institution in the twenty-first century. After all, most
millennial Americans no longer believe in slavery or sexism. We do not believe that
voters lack proper information about national candidates. We do not believe that a
national figure claiming a national mandate is unacceptably dangerous. What we do
believe is that eachAmerican is an equal citizen. We celebrate the idea of one person,
one vote-an idea undermined by the electoral college.
The obvious trend of constitutional amendments, of the electoral college in
particular and more generally, has been in the direction of increased equality. Indeed,
judging by the sheer number of chronologically distinct amendments to the electoral
college itself-a number made.strikingly visible by the very architexture of the New
Wing-the Framers' system of presidential selection and succession has been less
than a resounding success. Of the seventeen amendments ratified after 1791, three
amendments (the Twelfth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third) have directly and specifically
modified the electoral college; five more amendments (the Fourteenth, Fifteenth,
Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth) have directly but more generally
modified the college by counteracting its facilitation of widespread disfranchisement;
and two more amendments (the Twenty-second and Twenty-fifth) have reformed
closely related rules governing who shall sit in the Oval Office. All told, no fewer than
ten of the seventeen post-1791 amendments, have tried to push the system of
presidential selection and succession toward increased democracy. The top of the
amendment pyramid remains open, but many of the layers thus far seem to point in a
certain direction. Shouldn't a sensible future amendment abandonthe electoral college
altogether in favor of direct national election, one person, one vote?
V. INTERIOR DESIGNS
Having surveyed the Constitution's outside-its basic size and shape, front and
back, Old Wing and New Wing-let us now take a more detailed look inside.
Textualists traditionally focus on the document's meaning word by word and clause
by clause. Architexturalists seek a broader perspective, noting implicit patterns
organizing explicit clauses.
For example, there is no explicit clause proclaiming the general separation of
powers in so many words. But this general principle-subject, of course to specific
exceptions set out in various clauses-seems implicit in the very organization of
constitutional text into three separate articles creating three presumably separate
departments. What are the words "Article I," "Article II," and "Article Hi" doing if
not marking a separation? The implication becomes even clearer when one notices
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that each article opens with a rather similar vesting clause. 6 Just as the Preamble and
Article VII are evidently designed as a pair of matching portals, the three vesting
clauses are obviously designed to be read together in light of their precisely
symmetrical and prominent locations fronting the first three articles, their
complementary substance, and their similar syntax. Together, they form an ensemble,
communicating architexturally to a common citizen that the Constitution features three
separate and coordinate branches, the first of which (generally) legislates, the second
of which (generally) executes, and the third of which (generally) adjudicates.
Though no clause says so in so many words, the general architexture of these three
articles would seem to imply a basic coequality among the three departments. An
ordinary citizen in 1787 reading this document would be led to believe that none of
these three departments could properly claim to be the only or even the ultimate
decider of constitutional meaning. All three departments, our 1787 citizen might have
thought, would be part of the constitutional conversation, and in different scenarios
different branches might enjoy the last word. Congress, for example, can and should
refuse to enact any law it deems unconstitutional, even if the Supreme Court would
uphold this law. Likewise, Presidents may properly veto laws they consider
unconstitutional and pardon those convicted under such laws, even if the Supreme
Court has upheld or would uphold such laws. Courts too may refuse to enforce laws
they consider unconstitutional after giving due consideration to the contrary judgments
of coordinate branches. In cases of sharp and public disagreement among the
departments, it would seem most plausible that the people-whose constitutional
house this is, whose name is on the front gate-might also render judgment in the long
ran.
Had the document been designed to privilege the Supreme Court over all other
entities-to affirm not merely judicial review but judicial supremacy--surely it
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress .... "); id. art. II, § I ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President...."); id.
art. Ill, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish ....").
For an exploration of the textual similarities and differences among these three opening clauses,
see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1153, 1175-85 (1992).
77. For my own earlier discussion and analysis of this distinction, see Akhil Reed Amar,
Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
443,445-46 (1989) and sources cited therein. Other scholars have offered similar distinctions,
see, e.g., Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter
JudicialDoctrine, 21 GA. L. REv. 57 (1986); LarryD. Kramer, Foreword: We, the Court-The
Supreme Court, 2000 Term, 115 HARe. L. REv. 4 (2001). To summarize some of the troubling
dimensions of the Court's recent trend towards supremacy: (1) The Court is invalidating acts
of Congress at an exponential rate--two cases prior to the Civil War; less than one case a year
from the mid-l 860s to the mid-1920s; slightly more than one case a year in the Warren Court;
and more than four cases a year since the mid-1990s. (2) Much of the current Court's
regulatory regime is hard to square with the best reading of the Constitution itself. (3) The
Court is increasinigly privileging its own precedents-even assumedly erroneous
precedents-over the Constitution itself. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833,864 (1992). (4) The Court is increasingly aggressive in describing its own
constitutional status as "ultimate." (5) The Rehnquist Court-in sharp contrast to the Warren
[Vol. 77:671
ARCHITEXTURE
should have highlighted such an important point prominently and explicitly. Such a
point should have been made explicit in an architexturally prominent place in the
document, rather than implied in the fine print or simply conjured up by judicial
"interpretation" 150 or 200 years after the Founding. In fact, althoughthe Constitution
makes the Supreme Court supreme over inferior courts within its own branch, it
nowhere explicitly raises the Court above coordinate legislative and executive
departments. Rather, the Constitution lists the judiciary third among the three great
departments. From the order of the first three articles, and the specific wording of the
Necessary and Proper Clause giving Congress important powers to legislate
concerning the other departments,7 s the document suggested to citizens in 1787 that,
if any department could claim to be first among equals, it was Congress. The early
buildings in Washington, D.C., reaffirmed this message and did little to suggest
judicial supremacy.79
The general symmetry of the first three articles immediately following a preamble
proclaimingpopularsovereigntywould seemrto implya symnetric andpopulist model
of constitutional interpretation and implementation. This model is rather similar to
what Marbury in fact said, trumpeting popular sovereignty and acknowledging that
courts could refuse to enforce laws they deemed unconstitutional,just as legislatures
and executives could?'° Juries at the Founding were also part of the constituiffonal
conversation, as were ordinary citizens and voters more generally.
Consider for example how the nation's first major constitutional crisis was resolved.
The Supreme Court did not even have jurisdiction to decide whether the Sedition Act
of 1798-which made it a federal crime to criticize President Adams-was
constitutional. Supreme Court Justices riding circuit upheld the Act, but this was
hardly the end of the story. Grand juries were wholly free to refuse to indict intrepid
publishers if the grand jurors believed the Sedition Law unconstitutional, regardless
of what the Justices might think. Distinguished lawyers tried to persuade trial jurors
that they too should refuse to participate in enforcing a law they deemed
unconstitutional. When Justice Samuel Chase stopped trial jurors from hearing this,
Court-is trivializing Congress's coordinate role in enforcing and defining the Reconstruction
amendments. (6) The Court is increasinglyreaching out to decide constitutional issues properly
committed to other government actors. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 18 (empowering Congress to "make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or
officer thereof....") (emphasis added).
79. The size and early opinion practice of the first Supreme Court are also suggestive. If
the Court's institutional pronouncements on the Constitution were seen as qualitatively
different from those of other branches--"ultimate" rather than coordinate-why did the early
Court consist of an even number of members, who delivered individual seriatim opinions?
80. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803) (noting that the
Constitution is "a rule for the ... courts, as well as of the legislature"; emphasizing the
obligations created by judicial oaths under Article VI to uphold the Constitution-oaths
identical to those required of Congress and the President under the very same Article, and
concluding by declaring that "courts, as well as other departments, are bound by" the
Constitution) (emphasis altered).
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he was widely condemned-and later impeached.8 ' And the story doesn't stop there.
With the legal aid of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, state legislatures in
Virginia and Kentucky labeled the Sedition Act unconstitutional, and appealed to
citizens to protect their constitutional rights. In the election of 1800, the citizens did
just that by sweeping opponents of the Sedition Act into Congress and the
Presidency."2 The new Congress then allowed the Sedition Act to sunset, and the new
President (Jefferson) pardoned all who had been previously convicted.
The Justices in this story were hardly the only or even the last word. Indeed, the
Supreme Court as such had no word, and the last word went not to the Justices on
circuit but to the voters and the newly elected Congress and President. A symmetric
and populist model of constitutional interpretation embraces the very old and
established idea of Marbury-style judicial review-Justice Chase, after all, was
reviled and later impeached partly because he failed to engage in serious judicial
review of the Sedition Act-but rejects the modem and troubling claim ofjudicial
supremacy. Contrary to the words and deeds of the modem Court,u the nine robed
Justices in the great marble temple on First Street are not the unique and ultimate
authority on constitutional meaning.
The Article I-II-II ensemble was a prominent feature of the Constitution's original
blueprint, but other patterns have emerged later, as the American people have
periodically remodeled. The very idea of a Bill of Rights-of an interconnected
package of what were proposed, after all, as twelve separate amendments, only ten of
which were initially ratified-is architexturally highlighted by the adjoining placement
of all ten of these amendments, and their common date of ratification, distinct from
all other constitutional texts.
Whereas the first three articles adjoin, as do the first ten amendments, still other
architextural patterns may be seen in nonadjacent provisions adopted over the years.
Thus, we find a series of amendments-beginning with the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth, then later encompassing the Nineteenth, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth,
and Twenty-sixth-all authorizing Congress in almost identical language to "enforce"
their respective provisions by "appropriate legislation."" Together these enforcement
clauses comprise an impressive colonnade of congressional power in the building's
New Wing, gesturing back to Old Wing's Necessary and Proper Clause. That clause
81. For details and analysis, see AMAR, supra note 19, at 98-104.
82. Although, as we have seen, Jefferson's election was complicated by the slavery-skew
of the Three-Fifths Clause, the congressional election in 1800 was far more decisive. See
Kramer, supra note 77, at 97-98 & n.414.
83. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 536 (1997); United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 n.7 (2000).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."); id. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. "); id. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."); id. amend. XIX, cl. 2
("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."); id. amend.
XXIII, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.");
id. amend. XXIV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."); id. amend. XXVI, § 2 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.!).
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had spoken of "proper" rather than "appropriate" legislation, but in the leading
judicial gloss on that Old Wing clause, McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court had
pointedly equated the two etymologically related words.85
The current Supreme Court has misconstrued these New Wing's enforcement
clauses, in part because the Justices have failed to see the architextural colonnade.
McCulloch read congressional power broadly and deferentially. When the American
people in the Reconstruction pointedly used McCulloch language to reempower
Congress, they thereby instructed the Court to construe the new grants ofpower in the
same spirit, broadly and deferentially. The Reconstruction Congress also enacted
prominent and sweeping legislation under the Thirteenth Amendment in 1866, thus
clearly putting would-be ratifiers of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments on
notice that these new grants of power should likewise be read broadly. 6 Knowing all
this, We, the People, ratified these sweeping new grants of power, only to have the
Supreme Court change the interpretive ground rules expost facto with stingy readings
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement clauses.
Current caselaw makes a shamble of the constitutional colonnade: the Court has
upheld broad Congressional power to define "badges of servitude" under the
Thirteenth Amendment" but has never explained how similar broad power to define
badges ofcitizenship is somehow lacking under the symmetrically worded Fourteenth
Amendment. 8 As with its disregard of the I-I-II ensemble, the Court's
misconstruction here reflects its warped view that it is somehow the only or the
ultimate judge of all things constitutional. As we have seen, this self-image finds little
support in the Constitution's general architexture. The election of 1800 reaffirmed the
spirit of 1789: Congress may properly protect rights more vigorously than the Court
when those rights are threatened by federal officials. The antebellum and Civil War
experience taught a related lesson: Congress may properly protect rights more
vigorously than the Court when these rights are being threatened by state officials. In
the shadow of the Dred Scott 9 case, the Reconstruction Congress knew that it could
not always count on the Supreme Court to protect fundamental rights, especially of
blacks down South. Thus, the Reconstruction Amendments offered a system of double
checks in which both Court and Congress would protect individual rights against
states, with states generally held to the more protective standard, whichever that might
be. The great Founding architect James Madison had attempted to build just this
double check against unconstitutional state laws into the Philadelphia Constitution of
1787. He failed in this task, but the great Reconstruction architects succeeded, only
85. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
86. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, swept far beyond prohibiting "slavery" and
"involuntary servitude" as these would be understood by judges acting under Section 1.
87. See Jones v. Alfred Mayor Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
88. See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Bd. of Trustees
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
89. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
90. See JAcKN. RAKOVE, ORIGINALMEANINGS 81-82 (1996). Indeed, Madison would have
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to have Court dismantle their handiwork
VI. LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION
The existence of patterns across different articles and amendments should also
invite more careful attention to patterns within individual articles and amendments.
For example, why are rules about nonestablishment and free exercise9 ' found in the
same amendment as rules about freedom of speech and of the press, and the rights of
petition and assembly?9 Why is an obviously substantive right, the takings clause,
placed inside an otherwise plainly procedural Fifth Amendment?93 In my book, The
Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction, I attempt to tackle these and similar
questions posed by the first ten amendments. Rather than repeating this analysis, let
me offer two canonical examples of the potential significance of the location of a
given clause in influencing the proper interpretation of this clause. My two canonical
examples of what might be called locational textualism feature two of America's
greatest constitutional lawyers, John Marshall and Abraham Lincoln.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, John Marshall aimed to define the proper scope of
congressional power under Article I. In general, affirmative grants of congressional
power appear in Article I, Section 8; prohibitions on Congress appear in Article I,
gone even further, giving Congress a general negative on all state laws.
91. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for
a redress of grievances.")
92. This is a question that a noteworthy Harris Lecture on the First Amendment never asks.
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971). In this lecture, then-Professor Bork argues that "[c]onstitutional protection should be
accorded only to speech that is explicitly political," id. at 20. Does this mean that explicitly
religious speech should not enjoy constitutional protection, even though the First Amendment
discusses religion alongside speech and press? Reading the Constitution through clausebound
blinders, Bork never confronts this question-indeed, he never quotes the First Amendment
as a whole, or even mentions the word "religion." Likewise, he briefly discusses Founding-era
understandings of First Amendment freedoms but slights the Reconstruction-era Fourteenth
Amendment, which importantly modified earlier understandings of these freedoms. Bork is
emphatic that he would not protect "literary expressions" and "novel[s]" but nowhere confronts
what might be thought the paradigm case of free expression to the Reconstruction generation:
Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, a novel that blended literary, religious, and
political expression. For much more analysis, see generally AMAR, supra note 19, at 35-42,
231-57. On paradigm cases generally, see id. at 301; RUBENFELD, supra note 46, at 178-95.
93. See U.S. CONST. amend. V:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war
or public danger; nor shall 'any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice6 put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
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Section 9. Marshall's famous opinion appealed to this basic fact about the
Constitution's layout. The Necessary and Proper Clause, he noted, appeared in
Section 8; and thus was not sensibly read as a restriction on the earlier Section 8
power-grants; had it been so intended (as Maryland apparently argued) it would,
Marshall wrote, have appeared insteadin Section 9.94 Underiying Marshall's argument
is an obvious but powerful architextural fact about the Constitution: like a well-
designed building, it is nicely organized. Indeed, in the closing days of the
Philadelphia Convention, the delegates explicitly created a "Committee of Style and
Arrangement" to polish the Constitution's prose and configure its clauses in a graceful
and sensible way.9"
Oursecond andfinal example comes from 1861, whenAbrahamLincoln suspended
habeas corpus. If we look at certain words of the Constitution without attending to
their location in the overall blueprint, we find the following pronouncement: "The
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." So far, the clause would
hardly seem a problem for Lincoln. The text seems to envision suspension, and does
not explicitly say who may suspend. Specifically, it does not say that only Congress
may suspend, and there are good textual, practical, and structural reasons to think that
a President in Lincoln's situation should be able to make the decision.
Lincoln, after all, was in fact facing a real "Case of Rebellion" and the "public
Safety" did indeed require extreme measures. Washington, D.C., was a slave city
surrounded by the slave states of Virginia and Maryland. When Lincoln acted,
Virginia had already seceded, and Maryland was teetering on the brink. If rebel
sympathizers in Maryland were to succeed inwhipping up enough secessionist fervor,
Maryland would fall and D.C. itself would be surrounded and militarily indefensible.
Checkmate. What's more, Congress was not even in session. And this scenario was
hardly unforeseeable-the Framers had envisioned that much of the time, legislators
would be back home mingling with their constituents." The Framers must also have
foreseen that in some rebellion situations, a rebellion itself might forcibly prevent a
congressional quorum from being able to reach the capital. By contrast, the Framers
designed the President to be always in session, 24-7-365,' 7 It thus makes obvious
structural and practical sense that in circumstances like those of early 1861, the
President should have the power to suspend habeas corpus, at least until Congress
returned to consider the matter itself. Textually, this limited power to preserve the
prerebellion status quo until Congress could meet can quite plausibly be seen as part
of the "Executive Power" vested in the President by the first sentence of Article R."
94. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,419 (1819).
95. See 2 THE RECORDS, supra note 2, at 547, 565.
96. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I (discussing annual congressional meetings, congressional
sessions and adjournments, and congressional travel to and from the capital); id. art. II
(discussing recess appointments, and presidential power to convene special sessions in
extraordinary situations).
97. That is of course why Article II gives the President various gapfilling responsibilities
when Congress is not in session, such as the power to make recess appointments and convene
Congress.
08. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM, L. REV.
1(1993).
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But here is the complicating locational fact: The above-quoted nonsuspension clause
appears in Article l--Congress's Article-rather than the President's Article II.
Emphasizing this fact among others, Chief Justice Taney on circuit condemned
Lincoln's suspension as unconstitutional."°
Personally, I am with Lincoln on this one. Architextural arguments from blueprint
location must be considered alongside, and should ideally cohere with, more general
arguments of text, history, and structure. The location of the suspension clause in
Article I need not, by itself, mean that the executive power fails to encompass
suspension authority on the facts Lincoln faced. The blueprint location may instead
be read more modestly, as architexurally reinforcing the idea that the President's
suspension power is purely temporary, and lapses once Congress has had a genuine
opportunity to convene and consider the matter. Lincoln himself understood this, and
sought explicit congressional approval for emergency actions that he took in
Congress's absence and as Congress's agent, preserving the basic constitutional status
quo so that Congress could act. Had Lincoln not acted with alacrity, a violent and
unlawful rebellion undermining the very foundations of the Constitution itself and the
Preamble's first principles of republican union might well have hardened into a fait
accompli that Congress would have been unable to undo when it ultimately
reconvened.
VII. PARTING THOUGHTS
It is time to bring our brief architextural tour of the Constitution to a close.
Ina document designed for the people, not every detail is explicitly enumerated, lest
the Constitution degenerate into a "prolix legal code" that would discourage public
involvement.'0 ' McCulloch reminds us that certain governmental powers-like the
power to establish a national bank-are implicit rather than minutely specified. The
99. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, to be precise.
100.
The clause of the constitution, which authorizes the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, is in the 9th section of the first article. This article
is devoted to the legislative department of the United States, and has not the
slightest reference to the executive department ....
It is the second article of the constitution that provides for the organization of
the executive department, enumerates the powers conferred on it, and prescribes
its duties. And if the high power over the liberty of the citizen now claimed, was
intended to be conferred on the president, it would undoubtedly be found in
plain words in this article; but here is not a word in it that can furnish the
slightest ground to justify the exercise of the power.
ExParte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). Forasimilar argument,
see Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 41-42 (1866) (oral argument of David Dudley
Field).
101. For an earlier meditation in the Harris Lecture Series on ways of interpreting some of
the silences of the Constitution, see Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid:
Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
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Constitution does not explicitly enumerate a right of defendants to confront physical
evidence introduced against them, or the right to introduce physical evidence proving
their innocence, but surely these rights are implicit in the logic underlying those
specific defendant rights that are enumerated, like the right to confront witnesses, and
compel the production of witnesses." The Ninth Amendment probably goes beyond
this, but surely at a minimum it is a reminder that not all constitutional rights are
spelled out in tedious detail-some must instead be inferred from the document itself,
read holisitically. In the words of the amendment, we must not "deny or disparage"
rights that are plainly within the document as a whole even if not explicitly, minutely,
and specifically "enumerated." And what is true of both constitutional powers and
constitutional rights is also true of constitutional structures, such as popular
sovereignty, representation, and separation of powers; these too are not always
explicitly enumerated, but are nevertheless implicit in the document as a whole.
Architexture is one among several techniques by which readers can get a larger sense
of the document's holistic meaning, its feel and spirit.'
Nothing turns on the word architexture itself; if the neologism distracts, discard it.
The basic ideas today are not highfalutin but laughably simple. The Constitution is a
short document. Some parts of it-like the Preamble and the introductory language
of Articles 1, H1, and IR-are especially eyecatching. It adds amendments-to the end,
chronologically. It is openended. Thus far, its amendments have trended in the
direction of increased democracy and reduced plutocracy. It does not whitewash or
paper over its ugly parts. It features three coordinate branches of government and
vests none of these with ultimate supremacy over the others, over the document itself,
or over the people. It is rather carefilly organized. There are conceptual and linguistic
patterns at work-colonnades, motifs, and the like-if we care to notice. It is written
with style, and that style is, in a word, republican; the Constitution's biggest theme
from the beginning to the end in word and deed is popular sovereignty.
These very basic things often escape notice of clausebound textualists, who attend
to words and clauses but often miss the spirit of the Constitution as a whole. Many of
the features I have tried to highlight are not explicit legal commands, but are
nonetheless rich with interpretive meaning. They clarify what the Constitution in fact
is trying to say, to whom, and why. These architextural features of the document speak
to us, much as good architecture does.
103. Id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor...."). For more defense of my reading of the implicit logic underlying these rights,
see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641,647-49,
698 (1996).
104. I am obviously indebted to the work of John Hart Ely and Charles Black, both of whom
preached holism, althotigh Black explicitly defined his brand of "structural" interpretation in
contradistinction to textualism. See CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATION IN
CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 22-23 (19 ); but cf. id. at 31 (acknowleding certain linkages between
textual and structural analysis). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv.
747, 790, 797 n.197 (1999) (noting differences between Black's brand of structural analysis
and various versions of holistic textualism). On Ely, see supra note 62. For more general
analysis of various types of constitutional interpretation and argumentation, see PHILP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).
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Of course, architexture is only a metaphor. The Constitution is not literally a
building. But I am delighted to report to you that an actual building commemorating
the Constitution is now taking shape in Philadelphia, directly across the Mall from
Independence Hall. The National Constitution Center will open its doors on July 4,
2003. Designed for ordinary citizens-it hopes to host nearly a million visitors a
year-the Center aims to reintroduce the American people to the great document that
speaks in their name. Along the interior wall of the museum itself, the constitutional
text will be inscribed in large readable letters (with open space at the end for future
amendments). Within the building a host of multimedia exhibits will try to make the
document, its themes, and its unfolding and unfinished history vivid for layfolk from
all walks of life, of all ages, and from all parts of the country.
I hope you will visit this extraordinary building honoring an extraordinary
document. Before you go, I urge you to take a few minutes to read or reread the
Constitution itself. Read it aloud to your kids, and discuss it with them. When you
visit the National Constitution Center itself, encourage your family to read the writing
on the wall. You can even take notes.
